The paper demonstrates that whereas often in seismic geotechnical design it is not realistically feasible to design with ample factor of safety against failure as is done in static design, an "engineering" apparent seismic factor of safety less than 1 does not imply failure. Examples from slope stability and foundation rocking illustrate the concept. It is also shown that in many cases it may be beneficial to under-design the foundation by accepting substantial uplifting and/or full mobilization of bearing capacity failure mechanisms.
Factors of safety in geotechnical engineering
In engineering practice the unavoidable uncertainties (in loads, geometry, methods of analysis) and the associated severe risks from failure dictate the use of factors of safety (FoS), which by definition are greater than 1. In foundation design ample factors of safety (of the order of 2 À 3) are imposed on the static loads to avoid bearing capacity failure of shallow and deep foundations.
Historically, in seismic design the factors of safety were somewhat lower (by up to 50%), in view of the small probability of seismic occurrence during the lifetime of the facility. Thus, for foundation bearing capacity, a factor of safety of 2 under seismic conditions was deemed sufficient instead of the traditional 3 under non-seismic loads. In view of the un-realistically small levels of seismic acceleration of times past (seismic coefficients of the order of 0.05 À 0.15 prevailed even in regions of very high seismicity), keeping the factors of safety substantial (e.g., E2) was a prudent, easily satisfied requirement.
With the advent of the accelerograph, the levels of design acceleration increased significantly; this eventually necessitated the adoption of (explicit) factors of safety close to 1 (see for instance EC8-5).
It will be argued in this paper that the nature of the seismic factors of safety (F E ) is fundamentally different from the static F S , and that accepting seismic "engineering" F E (well) below 1 may even lead to a safer overall structure.
Earthquake engineering: the realm of "capacity design"
Structural earthquake engineering has long ago embraced the philosophy of "capacity design". The main idea is to design the various constituent members of a structure in such a way that members crucial for its stability, the columns, are stronger than the less critical members, the beams; and that the plastification of members should result from exceedance of their moment, not their shear capacity, thus avoiding brittle failures. Hence, against the design motion, flexural yielding is directed to take place in beams, dissipating energy without endangering the overall structural safety [1, 8, 27, 32, 33] .
"Capacity Design" for foundations has taken a slightly different turn: the overturning moment to be carried by the supporting below-ground members is increased over the calculated bending moment capacity of the superstructure (by applying an "overstrength" factor of about 1.3 À 1.5). Thus, the "hidden" safety factor utilized in the strength calculation of the concrete cross section is removed. The aim is to ensure that:
No plastic "hinging" develops below the ground surface; i.e.
piles, caps, footings remain structurally nearly elastic
No mobilization of bearing capacity failure mechanism takes place.
Therefore, since the subsequently utilized explicit seismic factors of safety are kept just above 1, the F E would be certainly larger than 1. This approach is imposed on foundation design mainly (but not only) because post-seismic inspection and repair below ground is hardly feasibleunlike the above ground structural damage [9] . The past Contents lists available at ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/soildyn argument of greater uncertainty with soils is still being invoked but less convincingly [10, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31] .
Why is it not always feasible in geotechnical engineering to achieve FoS41?
The levels of acceleration recorded in the last 30 years, with huge values of both peak (ground) acceleration [PGA] and response spectral acceleration [SA] impose a heavy load on foundations, even when the accepted inelasticity (ductility) of the superstructure is large. As examples, we just mention that several records of Kobe (1995) and Northridge (1994) had PGA values exceeding 0.80 g and maximum SA exceeding 2.0 g. Even small magnitude events, e.g. the 1986 San Salvador M S 5.7, produced peak acceleration of 0.75 g with proportionally large SA values at not-too-short periods. Calling for nearly-elastic response of the soil-foundation system is not only an expensive demand, but also one that in some cases could not be possibly satisfied (as for example when retrofitting and old structure to meet current code requirements). And in any case such a demand is incompatible with the design for high inelastic action (ductility) of the superstructure. After all it is the failure of the superstructure that could have the most severe consequences.
Under seismic base excitation FoSo 1 does not imply failure
The factor of safety (FoS) against any type of failure under static permanent loads, denoted hereafter as F S , must be kept above 1 to avoid failure (actually "well" above 1 to cover uncertainties). Under seismic shaking, FoS is a function of time. Hereafter by seismic factor of safety we mean the apparent min FoS(t) with respect to time. We will call it "engineering" factor of safety, F E . F E o1 does not necessarily signify failure. For two reasons, that relate to the nature of seismic excitation:
(a) seismic loading is cyclic (and, in fact, with rapidly alternating cycles as well) (b) the triggering seismic motion is an imposed oscillatory displacement at the base, i.e., it is a kinematic excitation, not an external "pre-determined" load on the superstructure.
Thanks to (a), the duration of F E o1 is limited (usually to tenths of a second) and the ensuing displacements are reversed before they reach the point of no return, due to the load reversal. Thanks to (b), the actual loads transmitted from the base upward to the critical-to-fail structure are limited by the actual capacity of the base of the structure or of the interface separating this structure from the base. In other words, as will be seen below, it is only the apparent "engineering" factor of safety, F E , that (momentarily) drops below 1.
The consequence of F E o 1 is a finite inelastic (permanent) deformation of the system: rotation, horizontal, vertical displacement of foundations, slippage of retaining walls and slope wedges.
Newmark's sliding block analog
In his seminal 1965 Rankine lecture, Newmark [23] proposed that the seismic performance of earth dams and embankments be evaluated in terms of permanent deformations which occur whenever the inertia forces on a potential slide mass are large enough to overcome the frictional resistance at the "failure" surface. He proposed the analog of a rigid block on inclined plane as a simple way of analytically obtaining approximate estimates of these deformations. Since then, the analog has seen numerous applications and extensions, three of which are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. (See also [30] .)
The concept of the pseudo-statically determined "critical" or "yield" acceleration, A C , is a key of the Newmark-type analysis. Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the concept with two asymmetric and one symmetric geotechnical problems. In the first two, A C is the pseudo-static "constant" base acceleration which induces inertia forces (mass Â A C ) in the system that just lead to sliding failure: F S ¼1. In the second application A C is the "constant" base acceleration that induces inertia forces in the superstructure the overturning moment and shear force of which just lead to a bearing capacity failure: F S ¼ 1 (under eccentric and inclined loading). The asymmetric and symmetric sliding block analogs (with an inclined and a horizontal base) are also shown in the two figures.
Newmark showed that when an embankment or dam is excited by an acceleration of peak amplitude A substantially exceeding the critical acceleration A C of a prone-to-failure wedge, it will simply experience a permanent (inelastic) downhill displacement-not necessarily excessive so as to constitute failure.
Examples: slope deformation when F E o1
Two numerical examples demonstrate the Newmark concept, that an apparent "engineering" factor of safety, F E , much less than 1 could be accepted in most practical situations as a satisfactory performance.
A slope with β ¼251 is sketched in Fig. 3 being 20 m high it consists with a friction angle φ ¼361 and is subjected to a base motion in the form of the recently recorded ccelerogram, "Lyttelton", in the M S 6.3 Christchurch 2011 earthquake. Being very close (not more than 4-5 km) from the seismogenic thrust fault, this record has a substantial peak AE0.80 g, along with a large peak velocity of 0.42 m/s. The critical acceleration, for the yield surface shown in the figure, determined by a static slope stability analysis is A C E0.20 g, a value not far from the infinite-slope approximation
Hence, in pseudo-static engineering terms the apparent factor of safety with the chosen excitation is only
Now, let us perform a dynamic analysis employing the Newmark analog: an inclined base of β¼ 251 and a coefficient of friction, μ, between block and base such that downward sliding is initiated by an upward "pseudo-static" acceleration parallel to the base and equal to
from which: μ E0.7. The results of the analysis are graphically illustrated in Fig. 4 . The top two plots superimpose the block response (acceleration and velocity) on the base excitation. It is noted that the two acceleration histories coincide when their direction is leftward ( À ), since the (opposite) inertial force on the block cannot cause it to slide uphillhence block and base are one, moving together. In the other direction of shaking ( þ), however, the (opposite) inertial force acts downward causing slippage, every time A 4A C . Notice that the largest acceleration of the block when sliding is just equal to A C . The consequence is an accumulation of slip-pages which by the end of shaking reach 14 cm. For most slopes and for such a strong shaking, this would be an acceptable displacement.
A second example of a steeper slope, β¼291, of the same material, φ ¼361; is subjected to a more typical strong ground motion: the Monastiraki record of the M S E 6 Parnitha (Athens) 1999 earthquake. Being 12 km away from the seismogenic fault the record has a peak acceleration AE0.51 g, but due to its relatively-high frequency content its peak velocity is only 0.15 m/s.
As the critical acceleration this time is
A C % tan ð36-29Þ g % 0:13 g the apparent engineering factor of safety is again
The results of the dynamic analysis are graphically portrayed in Fig. 5 . The trends are similar to those of the previous example, but due to the shorten duration of each slippage (thanks to the higher excitation frequencies) the final permanent downhill displacement is merely 3.5 cm-hardly a noticeable movement after a strong seismic event.
We mention (without the proof here) that a 2D finite element analysis of each slope with the accelerograms imposed as horizontal base motion and the material obeying an extended Mohr-Coulomb constitutive law results in even smaller inelastic permanent displacement than the 14 cm and 3.5 cm computed with the Newmark analog simplification. This further reinforces our main conclusion: F E ⪡1 does not lead to failure-not always, anyway. See [12] [13] [14] .
Rocking and toppling of structure on rock
A first simple proxy of a tall structure forced into rocking motion from a base seismic excitation is sketched in Fig. 6 : a rigid rectangular block (2b Â 2b Â 2h) resting a rigid base with tensionless but frictional contact. The pseudo-static critical acceleration A C of such a block refers to the overturning of block (in the direction opposite to the constant acceleration). Apparently:
as explained in Fig. 6 . Let us now see how the block will behave when excited by accelerograms with peak A4A C .
As an example a wooden rectangular block 9 Â 9 Â 30 cm 3 is placed on the Shaking Table of our Laboratory [8] . Under a constant one-directional (i.e., "pseudo-static") base acceleration just exceeding the critical acceleration A C ¼ ð9=30Þ g % 0:30 g the block will overturn.
Instead we subject it to the so-called Ricker wavelet, an interesting simple motion containing three main peaks of amplitudes: A ¼1.20 g (the largest) and 0.72 g the other two. Thus, the apparent factor of safety is
Three different dominant frequencies are parametrically chosen for the wavelet: 0.5 Hz, 1 Hz, and 4 Hz. The latter two are more representative of usual seismic ground accelerograms. The former is typical of really unique records bearing the effects of near-fault forward-rupture "directivity" and "fling-step" (see [16] ). The videos of the three experiments in the laboratory reveal that in none of the three cases do we have toppling of the block (and of course there is no such a thing as a residual rotation-the system is self-centering).
The recorded time histories of rotation depicted in Fig. 7 verify the observed survival. The low-frequency wavelet, the most dangerous, produces a maximum angle of rotation of about 0.285 rad, not far from the "overturning" angle
Higher frequencies produce much less rotation. The wavelet with f¼ 4 Hz in particular (which frequency is about the mean dominant frequency of most spectral attenuation relations!) is barely uplifting the block, and the only thing one notices in the reality of the physical experiment is just a trembling motion. Hence, an engineering F E much less than 1 does not lead to failure by overtopping of slender rigid structures, as already demonstrated in [16, 20, 34] .
Rocking and mobilization of soil failure
Avoiding bearing capacity failure under eccentric and inclined load transmitted from the structure onto the foundation has been of great concern to geotechnical engineers. Hence the traditional generous related factors of safety. So, it may come as a great surprise that mobilization of such failure mechanisms under the foundation during seismic shaking does not necessarily lead to failure, but simply to an (additional) permanent settlement and rotation [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 11, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24, 27] . Depending on the magnitude of such irrecoverable deformations, their development may well be acceptable in many situations.
An example of a simple one-bay five-storey building frame founded with a rigid raft foundation on soft saturated silty soil is presented here (Fig. 8 ) to demonstrate and explain the non-fatal consequences of bearing capacity mobilization under seismic excitation.
The definition of critical acceleration is illustrated in the figure. Under a one-directional base "pseudo-static" acceleration, A C , the inertia forces on each floor lead to an overturning moment M and a shear force Q on the foundation; in combination with the vertical load N, these static loads lead to a bearing capacity failure with Fig. 7(a) does not topple. And as Ricker pulse frequency increases the rocking response is reduced. uncontrollable permanent rotation and perhaps toppling of the building (a likely consequence for tall structures in which P À Δ effects could prove devastating).
In the particular example (from a historic significant earthquake) A C E0.12 g. With our understanding of the beneficial role of a high dominant excitation frequency, we deliberately select a low-frequency (hence harmful) motion from the Kocaeli (1999) earthquake. With a peak acceleration A ¼0.36 g, as base excitation:
The results are given in Fig. 9 in the illuminating form of three snapshots of the response of the structure-soil system at t¼4 s, 8 s, and 17 s. The last depicts the final stage, at the end of shaking. The first two are at moments when failure mechanisms have developed in the soil under the supporting edge of the foundation: below the left side when t¼ 4 s and below the right side when t¼8 s. Evidently, thanks to the alternating (cyclic) nature of the vibration, none of these soil "failures" lasts long. Soon it is being stopped, reversed, and essentially canceled-out by the "failure" mobilization under the other side. The end result, seen at t¼17 s, is mainly a settlement and a (permanent) rotation. These may well be acceptable in many cases. Fig. 8 . Simplified representation of the bearing capacity failure mechanism under a building and definition of critical pseudo-static acceleration. Fig. 9 . Snapshots of the response of a slender building triggered by a record with A¼ 0.36 g. Contours of the maximum shear strain are illustrated, revealing the failure zones at every instant.
It may even be beneficial to design with F E o1
In recent years several researchers have entertained the idea that "capacity design" for foundations may be un-necessarily conservative and technically a rather inferior idea [1, 7, 11, 15, 19, 21, 22, 24] .
The author and his coworkers have extended the idea by calling for a reversal of the current capacity design [1, 15] . Instead of overdesigning the foundation to ensure that it will not be damaged, we under-design it so that it may act as a "safety valve" protecting the superstructure from large accelerations. To this end, the overstrength factor is reversed to become an understrength factor (i.e., we multiply by 0.70 or less rather than 1.40 the structural moments). It is thus hoped that during strong seismic shaking the under-designed foundation will mobilize the inelastic mechanisms in the soil and at the soil-footing interface; such plastic "hinging" below the ground surface will limit the transmitted motion on the superstructure and allow it to perform without plastification.
The concept is demonstrated with the example of Fig. 10 . A reinforced-concrete bridge pier, with the shown dimensions and deck load, is supported on a stiff clay layer with two different square footings: one, 11 Â 11 m 2 , conventionally (and conservatively) designed, and the other 7 Â 7 m 2 unconventionally (and rather daringly) designed in accord with this new philosophy. (The superstructure remains the same.) For a seismic coefficient C S ¼0.30 appropriate for design in an EC8 region of the highest seismicity with AE 0.36 g and a behavior factor of about 3, the two foundation designs have the following pseudo-static characteristics:
(Note that for the conventional footing the controlling criterion is the magnitude of eccentricity which cannot exceed B/3-hence the resulting substantial F E ¼2. No such limitation is imposed to the unconventional footing.)
We subject the two systems to a severe record, Takatori, from the Kobe 1995 disastrous earthquake. As its peak ground acceleration is 0.62 g, about two times C S , the apparent engineering factor of safety against bearing capacity failure of the conventional and unconventional footings are, respectively,
The record and its 5%-damped response spectrum are shown in Fig. 11 , on which the fundamental periods of the two systems (T B ¼ 11 m E0.70 s and T B ¼ 7 m E1.15 s) are depicted and revealed that they correspond to the same spectral acceleration of about 1.5 g. (Hence, the comparison will be quite fair, if not a little disadvantageous for the unconventional system the [anticipated due to inelasticity] lengthening of the period of which will bring it into more severe shaking environment-an ascending response spectral branch.)
Admittedly, shaking with the Takatori record is a very severe testing, far more than the above two apparent factors of safety reveal. Fig. 12 vividly shows the consequences of the shaking. The conventional foundation, with its big size, barely induces some inelastic action under the edges of the footing; but the column base develops a plastic hinge with large irrecoverable deformation. Because of its substantial permanent rotation, P À Δ aggravation "pushes" it to collapse [24] .
By contrast, the small footing undergoes large rocking oscillations which produce mobilization of bearing capacity mechanisms, alternating under each side. The end result is a (permanent) Whether this settlement is acceptable or not depends, of course, on the type and function of the supported structure. But despite such a small F E and against such a pernicious earthquake shaking, the unconventional system survived-with injuries, undoubtedly.
Conclusions
(a) Pseudo-static factors of safety greater than (or equal to) 1 must not be un-necessarily enforced in earthquake geotechnical engineering, if realistic levels of effective ground acceleration describe the seismic threat rather than the minute design accelerations of the past. (b) In foundation design, mobilization of failure mechanisms in the soil or at the soil-footing interface: (i) do not necessarily lead to system failure; and (ii) their development may have a beneficial effect for the supported structure thanks (largely) to the reduction in transmitted accelerations. A potential price to pay: the residual angle of rotation and settlement may exceed the serviceability limiting values for some sensitive structural systems. Appropriate design improvements may help reduce their magnitude to acceptable levels.
